number ofmajor British drug companies. The MRC did not have the resources and expertise to develop interferon as an antiviral drug and therefore sought collaboration with industry. During the war a consortium of British pharmaceutical companies, incorporated as the Therapeutic Research Corporation, had collaborated on a penicillin development programme, but there did not exist a peacetime model for such a collaboration. Hence, the National Defense Research Development Corporation was entrusted with the task of making proposals for an agreement between the MRC and a selection of British drug companies.
In order to develop and carry out a collaborative research programme, a Scientific Committee on interferon was set up under the chairmanship of Isaacs. In the course of 1960, the scientific committee gave the go-ahead to prepare experiments with interferon on humans. In the first such experiment, which was carried out during January 1962, the effect of interferon on vaccination was tested on volunteers. Shortly afterwards, on 28 April 1962 a report of this trial was published in the Lancet which maintained that the clinical trial with interferon was based on unambiguous experiments with an antiviral substance in, successively, the test-tube (in vitro) and laboratory animals (in vivo) . The transition between in vitro and in vivo tests, and tests on humans was depicted as unproblematic. In addition, the experiment was said to show that interferon had an antiviral effect in man.
In retracing interferon's origin and developments up to the 1962 trial, I focus attention on two issues. First, the contingencies and uncertainties faced during laboratory and clinical practice are elucidated. In general there are erased from published scientific papers like the Lancet report. Thus, I show that the transition between in vitro and in vivo tests, and tests on humans was far from unproblematic, thereby demonstrating that self-evidence in biomedical experiments and experimental transitions is a scientific myth. Second, some aspects of the first successful postwar initiative to secure a collaboration between the British government and the drug industry are highlighted.
THE LANCET REPORT EFFECT OF INTERFERON ON VACCINATION IN VOLUNTEERS A Report to the Medical Research Council from the Scientific Committee on Interferon
Interferon is known to be produced in the course of many virus infections both in vitro and in animals, and it is thought to play a role in recovery from viral infections. It therefore seemed possible that it might one day find a use in the treatment of virus infections in man and animals. In exploring this possibility we have carried out a first experiment to see whether interferon prepared in the laboratory could prevent the establishment of a virus infection in man.6 These are the opening lines of an article in the Lancet, 28 April 1962. Subsequently, the reader is informed about the production of both interferon and a control fluid without interferon, the assays of interferon, the safety tests, and finally about the conduct of the trial. The safety tests were carried out both during and at the end of the production process.
During it, the researchers tested for the presence of viruses and bacteria; samples of the final 6 Scientific Committee on Interferon, 'Effect of interferon on vaccination in volunteers', Laoncet, 1962, i: 873-5, p. 873. product were taken for toxicity tests in mice and guinea-pigs; and, as a final test, the interferon, as well as the control fluid, was inoculated into the forearm of volunteers. Apart from a single case of swelling, no side effects were registered.
The trial was performed as follows. The interferon preparation and a control preparation without interferon, which looked alike, were coded according to a random list of coding letters and were distributed "blind" together with vaccine by the MRC's immunological products control laboratory in Hampstead. Subsequently, all the participating laboratories recruited volunteers who each received two injections with either interferon or the control fluid in one arm, 5 cm apart. The next day they were given vaccinations against smallpox at the same arm sites. For a fortnight afterwards, frequent readings of both arm spots were made and any lesions that developed were measured and noted. The observer and the vaccinator were different people so as to ensure that the observer would read the vaccine takes "blind". Thus the test procedure was a "double blind". Finally, the volunteer records were returned to the distribution laboratory, where the codes had been kept. The results prompted the following conclusion:
Definite evidence of protection by interferon was found and since the trials were carried out blind it is clear that the protective effects can be accepted as unbiased results.7
In addition to this conclusion, the report added a discussion of both the trial and its results:
The present trial was based on experiments in animals where it had been shown that interferon could prevent the development of a vaccinial lesion in the skin of the rabbit and of the monkey. Monkey interferon was known to inhibit virus growth in human cells in vitro and it was therefore used in this trial.8
To put it briefly, according to the report, the clinical trial with interferon was carried out as a result of unambiguous experiments with an antiviral substance in the laboratory. The transition from experiments in the test-tube and in laboratory animals to experiments with humans was depicted as unproblematic. In addition, the trial was said to have proceeded smoothly and unmistakably showed that interferon had an antiviral effect in man. Recent studies in the history and sociology of science which have examined the path from laboratory to published scientific paper have convincingly shown that scientific communications to learned journals have to be regarded as retrospective experimental narratives, which comply with stereotyped formats and do not accurately represent the research work made public.9 Published scientific accounts are reconstructions rather than records of the actual investigative pathway, and by reconstructing the research process into Ibid., p. 875. For studies on the reconstructive nature of published scientific accounts see, Karin Knorr-Cetina, The manufacture of knowledge: an essay on the constructivist and contextual nature of science, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1981; Michael Callon, John Law and Arie Rip, Texts and their powers: mapping the dynamics ofscience and technology, London, Macmillan, 1986 ; Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory life: the construction of scientific facts, Princeton University Press, 1986; F. L. Holmes, 'Scientific writing and scientific discovery', Isis, 1987, 78: 220-35; David Gooding, Experiment and the making ofmeaning, Science and Philosophy, vol. 5, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, p. 6; Peter Medawar, 'Is the scientific paper a fraud?', in D. Pyke (ed.) , The thread and the glory: reflections on science and scientists, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 228-33. a linear order of experimental narratives, procedures and choices are rendered invisible. In addition, printed public records lack the contingencies and uncertainties which scientists constantly face during their work and the subsequent management (negotiation) of uncertainty. Despite the fact that these studies have pointed out, and to some degree analysed the process of the deletion of uncertainty from scientific texts, this deletion process has only occasionally been described with reference to the details of laboratory and clinical practice. The same is true for the varieties of uncertainties faced by scientists. ' J. Immun., 1955, 75: 43-9, p. 43; David Tyrrell, interview, Salisbury, 21 May 1990. '9 An indication ofthe amount of virus in a test-tube fluid could be obtained by making a series ofdilutions of the fluid and adding a constant volume of fowl red blood cells to each dilution. Since red blood cells had been shown to agglutinate proportionally to the number of virus particles present, it was agreed by convention that the highest dilution at which complete agglutination occurred was taken as a measure for the virus concentration in a fluid. See, A. Isaacs, 'Laboratory methods used in investigating influenza', Glasg. med. J., 1948, 29: 357-61, p. 359. 21 The plasma membrane of these cells had been ruptured by chemical treatment and consequently these red blood cells had lost their haemoglobin content (pigment).
2) H. Donald and A. Isaacs, 'Counts of influenza virus particles', J. geni. Mic robiol., 1954, 10: 457-64, p. 459. 22 The nucleic acid could be either DNA or RNA and was present in the virus envelope. Three years after James Watson and Francis Crick had proposed the double helix model for DNA structure and function, the nucleic acid content of the virus had been shown to be the infective component and to play a vital role in viral replication, see Hughes op. cit., note 13 above, p. 101. they would use the same strain of influenza and the same method of viral inactivation that he had used successfully in previous interference experiments. Thus, for the greater part, their initial experimental set-up consisted of materials and techniques which had either been employed by Isaacs and Lindenmann in earlier experiments, or circulated in the local context of the division of Bacteriology and Virus Research.23 Standing face to face at the bench in Isaacs' laboratory, Lindenmann, Isaacs and a laboratory technician began by cutting and washing the chicken embryo membranes, heat inactivating batches of influenza virus, preparing red cell ghosts, and sticking part of the inactivated virus to these ghosts. After this preparatory work, they did a first experiment to see whether or not they could induce viral interference in their test-tubes. Pieces of membrane were put one by one into the test-tubes together with nutrient fluid and either virus stuck to red cell ghosts, free inactivated virus, or no virus. The latter was referred to as the control preparation. After twenty-four hours in a roller-drum the test-tube fluids were replaced by fresh solutions containing live virus and rolled anew. Half way through the first week, the amount of virus in each test-tube was quantified and the experimental results were written down in Isaacs' notebook. The results were encouraging and showed that both free virus and virus stuck to red cell ghosts were able to inhibit the growth of live virus in this "test-tube arrangement".24 Subsequently, they played around with their experimental arrangement in order to set the optimal experimental conditions for producing interference in the test-tube.
On 25 September a first attempt was made to visualize ghosts and virus particles in the test-tube fluid with the help of the electron microscope. Samples were taken at the start of the interference experiment and halfway through it, just before the test-tube fluids were discarded and replaced by fresh solutions and the live virus was added. By special request Robert Valentine, a researcher from the biophysics and optics department, immediately processed electron microscopic images of these samples from Isaacs' laboratory. The pictures of the first sample, taken at the start of the experiment, looked promising. Clearly visible structures of red cell ghosts with virus particles attached to them could be distinguished, and Isaacs showed Lindenmann that it was even possible to count the number of particles per ghost. But the photographs taken after the test-tubes had been rolled for a time were disappointing. The ghosts looked rather dirty and the electron micrographs were hard to interpret. They could not tell the difference in structure between virus particles in samples taken before and after the interference experiment, nor was it possible to tell whether in an additional control sample without membranes, which contained a mixture of virus-coated ghosts and empty ghosts, virus particles had become unstuck and transferred to the empty ghosts. In Isaacs' notebook two question marks serve to highlight the problems of interpreting these electron microscopic images.25 Despite subsequent attempts to refine the experimental procedures, Valentine did not succeed in producing much better images of ghosts, though there were hints that in the mixture of virus-coated ghosts and empty ghosts a transfer of virus particles from one to the other had taken place.26
According to Lindenmann, "at a certain moment in November 1956, after about two months of experimentation, Isaacs felt that something unusual was happening while re-using the test-tube fluid with inactivated influenza virus in a second interference experiment."27 Contrary to Isaacs' expectation,28 the interfering activity in the test-tube fluid had not dropped after incubation overnight of a chicken embryo membrane fragment with inactivated virus. For, when he added a second fresh membrane fragment to the same test-tube fluid after removal of the first fragment and incubated the tube again, he could measure about the same degree of viral interference in both membrane fragments. Isaacs thought that perhaps something like a new interfering activity had been generated. Lindenmann suggested to him the possibility that the observed effect could very well be due to a change in pH or to the absence of a nutrient in the test-tube. Isaacs, however, was struck by the idea that, somehow, new interfering activity had been produced, although he agreed with Lindenmann that the data present did not provide more than a dubious hint of this. As a joke, Lindenmann gave Isaacs' mysterious interfering activity the name of "interferon".29
Isaacs' notebook has an entry for 6 November 1956, starting with the sentence: "In search of an interferon".30 These words marked the decision to change course and test Isaacs' assumption that a new interfering activity had been generated during their experiment. From that day on, they worked long hours tinkering with membranes, viruses and test-tubes in order to reproduce and amplify the observed effect. In the course of this process, Isaacs' assumption that new interfering activity had been generated in the test-tube was substantiated by further data, though more than once they were beset with doubts. There always remained the possibility that this "interferon" would turn out to be an artefact, a noise instead of a signal. Finally, after consultation with Christopher Andrewes, the head of the division of Bacteriology and Virus Research, and a Fellow of the Royal Society, they decided that the data were convincing enough for them to write up the results of the experiment and to submit them to the Proceedings ofthe Royal Society. In their two articles Isaacs and Lindenmann claimed they had found a new interference-inducing factor named "interferon". This was said to be released in a test-tube fluid following the incubation of inactivated influenza virus with a piece of chicken embryo membrane. Soc., 1957, 147: 268-73. "interferon". By June 1957 they had shown that it was possible to prepare interferon in bulk, that it was conceivably a protein, and that it interfered with the growth of virus in the test-tube (in vitro) as well as in laboratory rabbits (in vivo). The latter deserves particular notice. In 1954 Isaacs had observed that if he injected rabbits intradermally with inactivated influenza virus, it interfered locally with a subsequent vaccinia virus infection. When a few years later a fluid, which was believed to contain interferon, appeared to interfere with the growth of vaccinia virus in a test-tube, Isaacs almost immediately tried out its effect on the animal model he had used before. Like the inactivated influenza virus earlier, it showed an inhibitory effect on the growth of vaccinia virus in the rabbit skin.32
Apart from a private demonstration of interferon's workings at Isaacs' laboratory for officials of the MRC, interferon's first official appearance was at a meeting of the Swiss Society of Microbiology at the end of June 1957. On that occasion, Lindenmann, who had returned to Switzerland, presented a paper on interferon. However, his claim to have found a product of the viral interference reaction which could induce an inhibitory effect upon the growth of live virus in a test-tube did not make much sense to most of the scientists present. His audience generally considered viral interference to be an interviral inhibition phenomenon due to the competition between an interfering and a challenging virus for some key constituent within the cell. The idea of a viral interfering factor did not seem to fit into this internationally accepted concept of viral interference. For example, Prof. Hallauer, one of Switzerland's leading bacteriologists, objected that "as this [interferon] was utterly new and contrary to all he had read, it must be rubbish".33 The only people who were interested in Lindenmann's paper were a couple of scientists from the pharmaceutical company Ciba Geigy. They had just started research on interferon, after Ciba observers in London had learned about its discovery, and wanted Lindenmann to exchange information with them on this possible lead towards antiviral therapy. So, in a letter to Isaacs, Lindenmann asked whether he would be against exchanging information with Ciba researchers.34 Isaacs' reply was quite explicit: "I think it is a very bad idea to show our manuscript to anyone in a commerical firm. I would be very much against your doing so in future."35 In a subsequent letter he added:
In this country we are all very sensitive about the fact that penicillin is a British discovery, but that we have to pay royalties to American commercial firms for every gram of penicillin we use. I am not suggesting that interferon is in the same class as penicillin but on general grounds I don't think it is a good thing to deal with commerical firms. It is much better that they should wait until our information is published and then they can 36 compete on even terms. 32 See the annual report from the bacteriology and virus research group of the NIMR, 10, 1956/57, held interferon, they anticipated difficulties if it were to be developed as a drug in the future.4' However, far from leading to a change of name, the article and letters led the MRC (who were quite "penicillin sensitive") to consider more urgently the patentability of Isaacs' discovery in order to protect the Council's interest in his work.42 The MRC first consulted their patent adviser at the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) to see whether or not the subject-matter was patentable, with the result that, in May 1958, applications were made for patents in the United States, Canada and Germany. Unfortunately, it turned out to be impossible to obtain a British patent because more than six months had elapsed since the first public "7 According to a 1941 article on pharmaceutical research there was a "tendency amongst academic workers to view with apprehension whole-hearted alliance with the research of any one firm", see, J. Liebenau, 'The British success with penicillin', Soc. Stud. Sci., 1987, 17: 69-86, p. 72. " As a result of the British "failure" to exploit penicillin, the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) was set up under the British Industries Act of 1948 to secure the development of inventions resulting from public research and if necessary to obtain patents for these inventions, see L. G. Matthews, Historn of pharmacyv in Britain, London, E. & S. Livingstone, 1962 , pp. 330-3. Derick Burke, interview, Norwich, 14 May 1990 , Norman Finter, interview, Beckenham, 25 May 1990 Recently it was found that this interference is mediated through a substance which has been named 'interferon'. Active preparations of interferon can be easily produced by the litre without special equipment, and the activity can be readily concentrated. Such preparations are potent inhibitors of the growth of influenza and related viruses in vitro, and preparations which have been concentrated 10-fold inhibit the growth of vaccinia virus on the chick chorioallantoic membrane or in the rabbit skin.45
According to a correspondent of the Daily Telegraph a Fellow of the Royal Society had said at a press preview: "I find enormous excitement in the promise of interferon". Glaxo and ICI) , incorporated as the Therapeutic Research Corporation (TRC), had collaborated on a penicillin development programme. However, soon after the war had ended, ICI had prematurely pulled out of the penicillin programme.59
Yet another meeting with all parties (NIMR, MRC, NRDC, Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome) was held on 3 July to settle the outlines of an agreement for a collaborative programme of further work on interferon. Since the MRC had not taken part in the TRC during the war and had no experience with a peacetime model for collaboration with the drug industry either, they had entrusted the NRDC with the task of making proposals for such an agreement. At the joint meeting, the NRDC proposed to set up an executive body to hold property, grant licences, and administer the arrangement between all the parties involved. They also suggested that the NRDC's patent holdings corporation, which had been founded in 1952 with the aim of carrying out future collaboration between, for instance, the MRC and industry, should be used for this purpose. In addition they proposed to set up a scientific committee, which would come under the executive body and provide a platform for the exchange of technical information and know-how. Following initial discussions of these proposals between the MRC, the NRDC and the three drug firms, it was agreed that an executive body should be set up and that the NRDC's patent holdings corporation would serve this purpose.60 In addition they agreed on a scientific committee to consist of research workers from the industrial firms and the MRC under the chairmanship of Isaacs. This committee was to be responsible for advising the executive body on the scientific aspects of further work on interferon.6' Work on the drug was provisionally defined as "work on a viral interfering substance produced by the action of partially-inactivated virus on a susceptible tissue".62
While negotiations on the clauses in the Collaboration Agreement were still in progress,63 the scientific committee started discussing a programme of research. problems were singled out.65 First, MRC's research workers had recently observed a species-specific effect of interferon both in vitro and in vivo. Interferon prepared in chick tissues appeared to have a much higher antiviral activity when tested in vitro in chick cells than it did in calf cells. Similarly, chick interferon was found to have a far less protective effect against vaccinia virus than rabbit interferon when tested in vivo in rabbits. Despite the fact that this species-specific effect did not seem to be absolute, it could have far-reaching consequences for future research, if it were to be substantiated by further experiments, since, experiments on the virus-protective effect of interferon in animals, and maybe later in humans, would require samples of interferon that had been produced in cells of the same or a related species.66 Second, the measurement of the antiviral activity, or potency, of interferon preparations came up for discussion. Apart from assessing different assay techniques (biological activity tests), the committee discussed the problem of the comparability of assay data. The antiviral activity of the same interferon preparation had been shown to differ widely depending on the laboratory, the test method, or the scientist involved. It was agreed that, in order to facilitate comparative measurements of activity in the collaborating laboratories, each laboratory would put aside some of its interferon to be used as a standard preparation in the other laboratories. Third, a number of points were raised concerning the production of interferon. For instance, it was agreed that, in order to meet future demands for large amounts of the drug, more efficient production methods were required. Moreover, satisfactory methods for the purification and storage of interferon had yet to be developed. Finally, the difficulties of work with animals, in particular the translation of experiments from the test-tube to the laboratory animal were on the agenda. Attempts had been made to see if the protective effect of interferon against the influenza virus in the test-tube could also be demonstrated in mice. In this connection the dose and intranasal administration of interferon presented difficulties in vivo.
Having outlined these research requirements with the aim of developing interferon as an antiviral therapeutic agent in man and animals, the committee decided on a provisional programme for further work.67 This focused on the development of methods for the large-scale production and purification of interferon. However, in the short term it was felt essential to examine thoroughly the question of whether or not interferon was speciesspecific. Thus, each laboratory would concentrate on preparing interferon from cells of one species and measure its antiviral activity in cells from other species.
The provisional status of the research programme in the scientific committee contrasted with the way in which a press statement on the collaboration, issued a little later, described future work on interferon:
The stage has only recently been reached when the necessarv development work that must precede therapeutic trial could be undertaken.68 [ The necessary work was said to include both pilot scale production of interferon and studies of its effect on experimental virus infections of animals. The notion of uncertainty had been erased from the statement, thereby presenting the work as a rule-bound enterprise which was to follow a well-known and necessary path for testing potential therapeutic compounds. This is not to say that the work in the scientific committee was not "necessary development work", but that its nature was different. It was beset with uncertainties and was far less rule-bound than the press statement leads one to suspect. Until the spring of 1960, research on interferon was carried out, more or less, along the lines of the provisional programme. The MRC's researchers mainly worked on the development of a purification method, the problem of the species-specificity, and the mechanism of action. Researchers because at the 'Perspectives of Virology' meeting in 1961 it was agreed that the name interferon should be adopted for antiviral factors with the same characteristics as VIF.73 About the same time in Britain in one of the drafts of the collaboration agreement, "interferon" was described as, any substance (other than antibodies) which is produced by the interaction of a virus and a living animal tissue and which is able to prevent, diminish or modify the multiplication of active viruses in living animal cells.74 This definition, which is formulated in broader terms than the former, evolved from discussions on the terms of a draft agreement relating to interferon between the participating parties in the collaboration. The fact that interferon did not denote a clearly characterized substance was a problem and it was agreed that a satisfactory definition should serve the purpose of both limiting the field of collaboration and of covering, under the agreement, as many natural virus-induced substances with antiviral properties as possible.75 It appeared to be rather difficult to find an acceptable definition which would be at the same time narrow enough and broad enough to satisfy both scientific and patent interests. The moment this definition made its appearance in the draft agreement it was immediately called into question. The NIMR research workers had just claimed to have found natural virus inhibitors which were different from interferon in that they shared serological characters with the virus responsible for their production. In order to prevent these newly discovered substances from being included in the field of collaboration on interferon, the NIMR urged for the following change in the wording of interferon's definition:
any substance (other than antibodies) which is produced by the interaction of a virus and a living animal tissue and which, whilst it lacks the serological properties of the virus, is able to prevent, diminish or modify the multiplication of active viruses in living animal cells.76 Thus, not only was the definition of the term "interferon" continuously affected by changes due to negotiations between the various interest groups, but it was also highly dependent upon the context in which it was handled. Modalities which widened or narrowed the definition were added and dropped on an ad hoc basis.77
At a meeting of the scientific committee in April 1960, after eight months of research, the provisional research agenda was changed radically.78 During this meeting, research 73 Monto Ho, 'An early interferon: "Viral inhibitory substance",' J. hIterferon Res., 1987, 7: 455-8 workers from the MRC reported the following two research results. First, when testing the specificity of interferon prepared in a variety of animal tissues, monkey interferon showed activity against a range of human and simian cells. In particular, the observation that monkey interferon appeared to be active against a number of respiratory viruses in human tissue-cultures aroused interest. It was agreed that, although extrapolation from individual tissues to the complete organism was hazardous, monkey interferon might be fit for future use in man. Moreover Wellcome's and Glaxo's experience with the production of poliomyelitis vaccine in large-scale cultures of monkey kidney cells was thought to be helpful in overcoming problems in the production and safety of monkey interferon. Second, the purification work on interferon had reportedly resulted in a pure product.
The prospect of the production of sufficient quantities of pure monkey interferon had a profound impact on the planning of further work on interferon by the scientific committee. Immediately four suggestions were made for future experiments with purified interferon in monkeys and humans:79 1) To test the protective effect against measles infection in volunteers. Since the MRC was in the process of assessing the effects of attenuated measles vaccine, facilities to test interferon's effect against measles would be available. However, it was remarked that measles is a systemic infection and therefore a measles trial would require considerable amounts of interferon. (This suggestion was made despite the fact that interferon's effect on measles had not yet been tested in vitro or in vivo.)
2) To test the protective effect of interferon on vaccination against smallpox in volunteers. There would be enough recruits available who had not yet been vaccinated and were willing to participate in a trial. Moreover, as a local infection it would need much less interferon than a systemic infection. (In the previous paragraph I pointed out that interferon appeared to have an inhibitory effect in the test-tube and on the skin of laboratory rabbits. Obviously, this experiment would be a translation of subsequent experiments in vitro and in vivo.) 3) To test the protective effect of interferon on respiratory infections in volunteers. A major advantage of this trial was thought to be the fact that the MRC had an official site for common cold trials in the form of the Common Cold Unit in Salisbury. In addition, the common cold was a local infection which would require only small amounts of interferon. (As mentioned above, interferon had shown a protective effect against respiratory viruses in the test-tube and, as such, this experiment would be a translation of experiments in vitro. Experiments with respiratory infections in mice, however, had not so far been very successful.) 4) To test the protective effect of interferon on trachoma virus infection in monkeys. This was considered to be an excellent experiment to do first, as a final check before experiments on man, and, as a local infection, it would require only small amounts of interferon. At that moment trachoma virus, which caused local infections in the eye, had just been cultured at the NIMR, and the MRC was keen on finding a therapy against this virus disease.80 (Like the measles experiment, this proposal was made despite the fact the interferon's effect on trachoma had not been tested either in vitro or in vivo.) 79 Ibid.
xo Statement of a senior MRC official during the discussion following the presentation of this paper to the Twentieth Century Medical History Group, held at the Royal College of Physicians, II February 1992. The scientific committee seems to have been keen on having an early demonstration of interferon's effect on man. It was aware of the fact that the American patent examiner had rejected interferon's patent application on utility grounds, and that if it could be shown to have an effect on man, even in an experimental infection, this decision would certainly be reversed. In addition there was a feeling that it would help to keep people interested and maintain the necessary pressure, because the negotiations on the collaboration agreement were not finished yet.81 At the same time interferon was looked upon as natural material that had been shown to be incredibly non-toxic in cells and was therefore expected to be harmless to humans.82 Since the representatives of the firms did not think it possible to produce large amounts of interferon in the short term, the committee decided to plan collaborative experiments for vaccinia, the common cold and trachoma, which would require only limited amounts of interferon.83 In addition they agreed to carry out the trachoma experiment on monkeys first.
Thus the committee discussed the preliminary work that was required and the ways in which its members could be responsible for different parts of the projects. For instance, David Tyrrell suggested the respiratory virus experiment be carried out at the MRC's Common Cold Unit in Salisbury, but not without extensive preliminary toxicity tests, while Wellcome and Glaxo scientists expressed their willingness to start producing large batches of monkey interferon. All agreed that an early start had to be made with work on the large-scale production, purification and storage of monkey interferon.
One of the MRC's officials made the following comments on the minutes of this meeting:
Please see the minutes of the sixth meeting. This collaboration seems to be going very well. They have purified interferon and now think they have a pure product. They are also now considering experiments on volunteers. Isaacs thinks that these experiments may take place about autumn.84
However, Isaacs' prediction that the first experiments on volunteers would be performed in the autumn of 1961 did not come true. At the next meeting in June, Tyrrell informed the committee of an experiment with monkey interferon on volunteers that was being carried out at the Common Cold Unit. A couple of days earlier, Tyrrell and a fellow member of the committee had inoculated themselves intranasally with a small amount of monkey interferon they had prepared in their laboratory at Salisbury. The night before the meeting they had challenged themselves by the same route with Coe virus, a type of Coxsackie virus, which was known to cause colds in humans. In previous tests this virus had been shown to cause colds nine times out of ten. A few months later Tyrrell reported that although his colleague had not had a cold, he had had one, and that the virus had been isolated from nasal washings of them both. Further, the interferon had not produced side-effects. The members of the scientific committee therefore agreed that a formal trial using volunteers was workable.85 Despite this early small-scale experiment with committee members as guinea-pigs, Isaacs' timetable for the planned experiments turned out to be over-optimistic. Because of problems with scaling up production and purification techniques in Wellcome's and Glaxo's laboratories, it was April 1961 before the first small batch of interferon became available for initial safety and potency tests.86 The fact that the production of interferon took much longer and resulted in less than was anticipated put the collaboration within the scientific committee under strain for a while. Isaacs, in particular, was disappointed by the slow rate of progress. In a letter to the MRC he even spoke about "the feeling that the firms were dragging their feet".87 During one of the committee meetings he brought the matter up and proposed to speed up the process by distributing the research work more efficiently among the different laboratories. However, the other committee members did not share Isaacs' feelings, although they found it advisable to have a more frequent informal exchange of information.88 Meanwhile, the trachoma experiment had been cancelled. According to Isaacs, interferon might not be active against the trachoma agent and it would be best to concentrate on the vaccinia and common cold experiments.89 Since the vaccinia experiment seemed to require less preparatory time, it was chosen as the first test for interferon's activity in humans.
In Britain, at that time, there was no compulsory safety system for testing drugs, and no unified system of toxity tests for clinical trials which would provide a regulatory context for experiments with interferon on man. In addition there were no formal rules on how to carry out a clinical trial.9>) So the committee started with general discussions about the nature of the safety tests that should precede the trial. They agreed that small numbers of volunteers should be used before any large-scale trial was performed and that exhaustive safety tests were needed, but there were differences of opinion about the exact nature of the tests. Should they apply the same test procedures which were being used in the production of vaccines, or should they design a new test protocol? For instance, one of the committee members argued that quarantined animals, which were being used to test the safety of the polio-vaccine during its production process, would greatly increase the , 1972, pp. 121-41. expense of the project and that it was more important to pay attention to the safety of the final product.9' On the basis of these discussions, preliminary safety requirements were drafted for the production of interferon for clinical trials.92 In order to finalize a detailed test protocol, a special interferon safety test meeting was held with experts from the MRC' s immunological products control laboratory in Hampstead, where a lot of knowledge and skill in testing the safety of vaccines had been accumulated over the years and it was thought that, as a biological product, interferon would profit from this pooled experience. The test protocol that resulted from the discussions with the experts at Hampstead required a series of in vitro and in vivo tests, during and after the production process, so as to exclude the possible presence of bacteria and viruses. The exclusion of viruses was regarded as particularly problematic, since small quantities of active virus might always be masked by the presence of interferon as a potent inhibitor of virus growth. It was agreed that the same methods should be applied as were being used in the production of vaccines, since no method of excluding viruses was known to be fool-proof.93 Finally, I should mention two major problems encountered during and after the vaccination experiment early in 1962. According to the safety protocol of the trial, the monkey interferon to be used in this experiment was to be subjected to a series of final toxicity tests which were also used on a routine basis in the production of vaccines. First, interferon had to be injected in mice and guinea-pigs. If no adverse effects were registered in the laboratory animals, it would be injected into the skin of the arms of members of the committee. If this test was also satisfactory the trial would proceed.94 In practice, the toxicity tests in mice went satisfactorily, but this was not the case for similar tests in guinea-pigs, which died within three to four days of an inoculation with interferon. Consequently, a debate arose within the committee over the safety of interferon. A Wellcome scientist pointed out that guinea-pigs were known to be highly susceptible to small amounts of penicillin, and that there might be enough penicillin in the interferon preparation to be fatal. Penicillin was present in the injections since it was used to prevent bacterial infection in the large-scale culture of monkey kidney cells in which the interferon was produced. After much discussion, it was ageed that both evidence in the literature and personal experience pointed to a singular sensitivity of guinea-pigs to penicillin, and it was decided to go ahead with the experiment. As a safety measure penicillin-sensitive volunteers were excluded from the vaccination trial.95
The second problem occurred after the trial. At a routine check of the research results from the participating laboratories, an MRC official came across oddities in the figures from the Wellcome laboratories. I do not know what made him find them or what they were, but there was a considerable difference between the data from the NIMR and Wellcome. At the NIMR 23 volunteers had been vaccinated against smallpox at two sites on one arm, where they had previously been inoculated with interferon and the control. There had been 17 volunteers with a lesion at the control site and no lesion (hence successfully protected) at the interferon site. On the other hand, at Wellcome 19 volunteers were tested, but only 8 cases were reported with a lesion at the control site and no lesion at the interferon site.96 At any rate, the official informed Isaacs, who, on closer examination of the research data, could not escape the impression that Wellcome had tampered with codes and numbers. Moreover, there had been a failure to blind the observer, since the observer and the vaccinator were the same person, and, furthermore, the observer also took part as a volunteer in the trial. In consultation with the scientific committee, Isaacs tried to cover up for Wellcome's research data in a draft of the research report. However, Dr Edwards, who had been responsible for the trial at Wellcome, discussed the matter with him and said that it would be better not to make any reference to the Wellcome data. Isaacs, in turn, contacted the MRC and asked for advice. The medical officer in charge at the MRC was not sure himself and told him to discuss the matter with Sir Charles Harrington. Subsequently, Harrington decided in consultation with the research director of Wellcome that its research figures should be deleted from the text of the report.97 In the meantime the original report had been submitted to the Lancet but was being held up until the matter had been settled. With the "delete decision" in mind it is surprising to see that in the final Lancet report three Wellcome volunteers can still be found (see Table 1 ).98
In spite of the excitement in the scientific committee about the outcome, the vaccinia trial had a negative impact on the interferon enterprise. The managing boards of the three companies were not at all convinced by the outcome, which they thought was rather trivial. Interferon had shown only a minor effect in a minor viral disease. Furthermore, it had cost a lot of money to perform the vaccinia trial. Apart from the high costs of producing only minute amounts of interferon from monkey kidney cells, the production process was bedevilled by many technical problems and there was no immediate prospect of an alternative source for human interferon. It was felt that interferon was not worth the effort that was being put into it. As a result, the commitment of the three companies to the interferon enterprise came under pressure.99
At about the same time, the scientific committee embarked on a second experiment with interferon on human volunteers. This time the committee chose to test the protective effect of interferon against the common cold. It was argued that if it were to show an effect against a frequent viral disease like the common cold then interest within the consortium would be restored. The trial did indeed have a great impact, because, when it became clear that no effect could be detected, the interest in interferon within Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome Lancet, 1962, i: 873-5, p. 874. plummeted. In spite of the fact that the scientific committee argued that the failure was probably due to the low dosage and the impurity of the preparation, interferon was regarded by the management as a clinically useless, undefined biological entity, which only showed an effect in the test-tube and for which no economical production method was available. Yet the collaboration continued, mainly because the companies felt, as they expressed in their memoranda, that they had an obligation to the government to do so. However, there was reluctance within the consortium to spend more money on the production of monkey interferon and to proceed with tests on humans. Confronted with a sharp decline in resources and the obvious lack in understanding of interferon's action, the committee shifted attention back to tests on animals and cell cultures. ' hoc judgment had to be made as to whether or not to pursue this artefact instead of further testing the "nucleic acid hypothesis". The words "in search of an interferon" in Isaacs' notebook marked the decision to change course and test Isaacs' assumption that new interfering activity had been generated in the test-tube. Another period of "tinkering" with membranes, viruses and test-tubes followed. In this process of fine tuning the experimental arrangement the presence of an interfering factor was readily substantiated by further data, though more than once Isaacs and Lindenmann were beset with doubts. There always remained the possibility that this "interferon" would turn out to be a noise instead of a signal.
Once interferon had acquired a rudimentary fact status within the NIMR, attempts were made to present the "new-born" to the outside world. Initially it got a cool reception from the scientific community, despite the publication of two articles on it in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. In general, the idea of a viral interfering factor was considered to be at odds with the established view on viral interference as mediated by virus particles. Moreover, those who tried to repeat Isaacs' and Lindenmann's experiments in other laboratories had difficulty replicating them. However, the moment interferon was presented as an antiviral substance, a potential medical innovation, it gained momentum. By bridging the gap between laboratory and medical practice interferon gained more certainty. In particular the penicillin metaphor played a major role in this respect and was instrumental in mobilizing interest in interferon, principally in the UK.
The first reference to penicillin was made by Isaacs in response to a letter from Lindenmann, who asked for permission to exchange information on interferon with a commercial drug firm as a possible way towards antiviral therapy. As we saw, Isaacs fiercely opposed this request, thereby highlighting the sensitivity in Britain over the fact that penicillin, which was a British discovery, was developed by American commercial firms. In doing so Isaacs was reflecting a general feeling amongst government and academic workers that because of the inability to control the patents, penicillin had been given away gratis to commercial drug houses, and in particular American commercial firms. To avoid a recurrence of that situation, most workers proceeded with caution in the case of new findings, until the results had been published or patents had been filed. This "penicillin sensitivity" subsequently affected the MRC. The latter had been informed about the discovery of an antiviral substance at the NIMR early on, but no further steps were taken until the possibility to develop interferon as a drug suggested itself. It was immediately felt that, in order to protect the Council's interests, interferon should be patented. The MRC's interest increased even more when, after a public demonstration of interferon's effects at the Royal Society and the subsequent press coverage, commercial drug firms, in particular American companies, approached the Council with requests for information on interferon. If interferon proved to be the new "antiviral penicillin", the opportunity should not be lost to develop it as an antiviral drug in Britain. However, the MRC realized it lacked the resources and expertise for such an undertaking and decided that British drug firms should be the first to collaborate on interferon. Until then, drug companies had been successful in developing drugs against bacterial diseases. However the firms were still waiting for the first effective antiviral to leave the research laboratories. Thus, the idea that Isaacs had possibly found a kind of "magic bullet" against viruses was appealing. It is not surprising therefore that most British drug companies were present at a first meeting with the MRC, which was held to inform them about the state of affairs concerning interferon.
Ultimately Glaxo, ICI and Wellcome told the MRC of their willingness to co-operate on a considerable scale. Then Glaxo and Wellcome were prepared to act as one party in this work, thereby hoping to exclude ICI from collaboration with the MRC. A possible explanation for this could have been the unhappy experience of both companies with ICI as a collaborator on penicillin at the end of the Second World War. However, the MRC decided it could not arbitrarily exclude ICI. Since the MRC had not taken part in the TRC during the war and had no experience with a peacetime model for collaboration with the drug industry either, they entrusted the National Defence Research Corporation with the task of making proposals for a collaborative agreement with the three drug companies. In consultation with the firms it was decided to set up an executive body to hold property and administer the arrangement, and that a Patent Holdings Corporation would serve this purpose. Furthermore they agreed on a scientific committee to consist of research workers from all parties under the chairmanship of Isaacs, to advise the executive body on scientific matters. It was this scientific committee which was mainly responsible for the planning and realization of the Lancet trial.
Right from the start the research workers faced difficulties in communicating research results. Part of the problem was due to the initial distrust between industry and academic workers, but there was another reason. The antiviral activity or potency of one interferon preparation had been shown to differ widely depending on the laboratory, the test method and the scientist involved. In order to handle these variables and reduce the uncertainty regarding the exchange of research data, the committee agreed to set standards for interferon tests.'0' In addition there were ambiguities in translating experiments from the test-tube to laboratory animals, or to humans. Apart from technical uncertainties (e.g., differences in dose and route of administration), the transition involved the more fundamental question of whether or not extrapolation from one organism to the other could be justified. This uncertainty regarding experimental transitions was handled in a rather pragmatic way. When scientists reported the observation that monkey interferon showed an activity against viruses in human cells in the test-tube, it was agreed that extrapolation from individual cells to the complete organism was hazardous. Yet it was decided to proceed with experiments in monkeys and humans. The factors involved in this decision have been shown to be manifold. For instance Glaxo and Wellcome workers had experience with the large-scale production of biological products (vaccines) in monkey cells and it was therefore thought that safety and production problems would be manageable. At the same time it was announced that the purification work on interferon, which was looked upon as a non-toxic natural material, had resulted in a pure product. In addition the patent examiner had rejected interferon's patent application on utility grounds and an effect in man would certainly help to reverse this decision. In the latter case the political uncertainty concerning interferon's patent position interfered with the uncertainty in laboratory practice.
With regard to the Lancet trial, the decision to do a first test with interferon on vaccination against smallpox in volunteers, was largely based on ad hoc criteria and judgments.'02 Some of these concerned the amount of interferon needed in the trial, the preparatory time, again the patent situation, and the availability of test objects or facilities. This is not to say that the decision was unscientific. Ad hoc judgments and assumptions are part and parcel of science and technology,'03 due to the contingencies and uncertainties that govern developmental practices. This is especially true for the planning of the vaccinia trial, since there was at that time no compulsory safety system in Britain for the testing of drugs and no unified system of toxity tests to allow for clinical trials which "" For an extensive account of the role of standardization in the development of biologicals, see, Nelly
Oudshoorn, 'The making of the hormonal body', PhD thesis, Amsterdam, 1991. 102 Brian Wynne pointed out the important role of ad hoc rules and judgements in developmental practices such as clinical trials in: B. Wynne, 'Unruly technology: Practical rules, impractical discourses and public understanding.' Social Studies of Science, 1988, 18: 147-67, p. 162 .
"'-Feyerabend, Garfinkel and Lynch pointed out the central and essential role of ad hoc reasoning in scientific practices, see Michael Lynch, Art anid artefact in laboratory scientce, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, pp. 134-5. would provide a regulatory context for experiments with interferon on man. I have clearly shown that in order to cope with the uncertainties in the preparations for the trial, and during the trial itself, the scientific committee relied heavily on knowledge and skill derived, over the years, from testing biological products, in particular vaccines, both within the companies and the MRC.
My detour behind the scenes of a clinical trial clearly shows that in the future it would be better to start from the premise that, if anything is evident it is the lack of self-evidence in bio-medical experiments and experimental transitions.
